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THE 199:1 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION: 
* 
WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL CAN DO 
When the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, its authors declared that one of its 
purposes was to promote and encourage respect for human rights and funda­
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion (United Nations Charter, Art. 1.3). Three years later, the members of 
the UN adopted the Declaration of Human Rights, which detailed the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms all people should enjoy and established a 
moral standard by which state actions toward its citizens could be measured. 1 
But not all members, despite their pledges and approval, honour these com­
mitments. 
* Subsequent to the writing of this paper a further UN resolution was passed in 1995, repeating 
the call for the secretary general 'to continue his discussion with the Government of 
Myanmar in order to assist in the implementation of the present resolution and in its efforts 
for national reconciliation', and to report to the General Assembly and the Commission on 
Human Rights (A/C 3/50/L52 5 December 1995). At a March 1995 meeting of the 
Commission on Human Rights, in Geneva, the Commission encouraged the secretary 
general 'to continue his discussions with the Government of Myanmar in order to assist in 
the process of democratization and nat ional reconciliation . . .  ' (EICN.411995/LJOJ 3 March 
1995). However, references to 'national reconciliation', which was emphasized in the UN 
speech by Burma's foreign minister in 1994, did not appear in his 1995 speech. 
Since this paper was written, Aung San Suu Kyi has been released from house arrest, but her 
movements and activities remain heavily circumscribed. In October 1995 the SLORC 
refused to recognize her reappointment as general secretary of the National League for 
Democracy (NLD); in December she was taken to military headquarters and warned against 
attending a Karen new year celebration; and she and other members of the NLD must obtain 
permission to travel within Burma. 
Following the Burma military' s violent and brutal suppression of peaceful 
popular demonstrations for the restoration of democracy and human rights on 
18 September 1988, the nations of the world and international organizations 
condemned their actions and used a variety of political, economic and diplo­
matic means to try and persuade the military rulers, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC), to allow the Burmese people to achieve their 
goals. 
As early as 1989, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) took 
note of events in Burma and began investigations. It subsequently appointed a 
special rapporteur, Y azo Yokota, to visit Burma and make specific inquiries. 2 
Because SLORC would neither comply fully with the investigator nor take the 
necessary actions called for in the resolutions, the UNCHR made its reports 
and resolutions public, thus giving the widest publicity to violations of human 
rights by the Burma armed forces. 
Independently, the UN General Assembly, in 1991, began to examine and 
discuss human rights violations and denial of democracy in Burma. Following 
careful examination of charges and complaints the General Assembly adopted 
four successive resolutions which, like those adopted by the UNCHR, called 
repeatedly upon the rulers in Burma to halt their brutality and disregard for 
human rights and allow the people to establish a democratic multiparty system 
of their own choice. On 13 December 1994 the UN General Assembly 
adopted by consensus a resolution which expressed grave concern that 
SLORC 'still had not implemented its commitments to take all necessary steps 
towards democracy in the light of the results of the election held in 1990 ... ' and 
continued the violations of human rights detailed by the UNCHR Special 
Rapporteur. It repeated its earlier calls for the SLORC to release Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, to end human rights violations, to 
restore democracy, and 'to respect fully the obligations of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, in particular the obligations in common article III . . .  '. 3 
Several nations around the world, including the US, Japan, and members 
of the European Community, cut off aid, halted lending, and refused to renew 
some bilateral trade agreements in order to persuade SLORC to honour its 
international obligations and the resolutions of the Commission on Human 
Rights and the UN General Assembly. 
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But many other nations draw upon the UN Charter' s Art. I. 7 - which 
holds that the world body 'shall not intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ... ' - and do not believe that any 
international body or nation has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Burma. 
Several of these nations which allowed themselves to be included in the 
1994 consensus resolution went with the flow rather than have a full debate 
and recorded vote because they knew that General Assembly resolutions are 
recommendations only and carry no mandatory obligations upon members to 
carry them out. 
The ASEAN countries, Burma' s nearby neighbours, do not believe that 
bringing pressure on the military rulers of Burma will lead to change; instead, 
they have sought to employ 'constructive engagement' - which assumes that 
the SLORC will remain in control and, therefore, that the best way to deal 
with it is by expanding ties, increasing foreign influence, and promoting 
economic growth. 
The SLORC's permanent representative to the UN, U Win Mra, made 
Burma's position perfectly clear in his response to the 1993 General Assem­
bly resolution: 
. . .  the resolution flagrantly attempted to interfere in the internal affairs 
of the Union of Myanmar . .  .it completely ignored the principles ... of 
impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, on the promotion of hu­
man rights ... the resolution was totally unacceptable to the Govern­
ment .of Myanmar and the Myanmar delegation dissociated itself 
from its adoption.4 
With a divided UN and SLORC's  unwillingness to be deflected from its 
self-chosen course, the authors of the resolutions tried a new tack in 1993, 
requesting the assistance of the secretary general in implementing the resolu­
tion and reporting to the 1994 General Assembly. 
The secretary general carried out the request by transmitting the UNCHR 
special rapporteur's interim report and addendum on the human rights situa­
tion in Burma. He also distributed a letter from Bunn.a' s permanent represen­
tative which answered the charges raised by Yokota and others. In his own 
report, the secretary general described his efforts to establish contact with the 
leaders of SLORC and start a dialogue. He met with Burma' s foreign minister, 
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U Ohn Gyaw, at the UN where they talked about SLORC' s  plan to restore 
democracy to Burma, about human rights and humanitarian issues, and about 
the prospects for reintegrating the national races in Burma' s political life. 
A second meeting took place in Rangoon between the secretary general ' s  
representative, the undersecretary general, Rafeeudin Ahmed, Burma' s for­
eign minister and members of SLORC. The secretary general concluded that 
the talks did not produce the results he desired because SLORC refused to 
allow his representative to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and would not 
accept any of the specific ideas offered by the UN on resolving the issues 
raised in the several resolutions and reports; nevertheless, he welcomed 
SLORC' s agreement to continue the talks.5 
The 1994 resolution enlarged the UN General Assembly's  request for 
help from the secretary general. In addition to continuing his discussions with 
SLORC, it asked him to assist SLORC' s efforts to achieve national reconcili­
ation and to report to the next General Assembly and the 1995 meeting of the 
UNCHR.6 
'National reconciliation' is a term which the SLORC uses as one of its 
justifications for continuing to rule the peoples of Burma. The SLORC has 
spoken repeatedly of the 'Three Causes' which forced it to take power, and 
how it works vigilantly to prevent the disintegration of the Union, to prevent 
the disintegration of national unity, and to protect the perpetuation of national 
sovereignty. 
SLORC argues that disunity in Burma can be traced back to the period of 
British rule, when the imperialists practised a policy of 'divide and rule' and 
institutionalized the separation of the Burman majority from the ethnic mi­
norities. 7 At the time of Burma' s independence in 1948, it says, it was British 
insistence upon a federal political system with the 'right of secession' for the 
Shans and Karenni which kept the peoples divided and gave rise to multiple 
insurgencies. The unrest in 1988, it argues, could have been the prelude to the 
end of national sovereignty had the army not acted decisively. SLORC' s  
permanent representative to the UN, U Win Mra, said: 
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. . .  unity among the national races is vital for the preservation of the 
independence and sovereignty of Myanmar as well as for economic 
and social progress of the country. Beset with internal strife started by 
various armed groups immediately after independence, Myanmar has 
lagged in economic development far behind other nations in the 
region. The State Law and Order Restoration Council therefore at­
taches great importance to the strengthening of unity and solidarity 
among all national races. Since its inception, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council has been giving priority to the achievement of 
national reconciliation (United Nations General Assembly A/C.31491 
15, op. cit., p.4). 
During discussion of the 1994 resolution, U Win Mra reminded the 
General Assembly that the process of national reconciliation was an internal 
matter. 'We shall seek to . . .  find a domestic solution . . .  without any outside 
involvement'. 8 Since U Win Mra did not say specifically that SLORC would 
reject an offer of help from the secretary general, it seems possible that he will 
be able to carry out his charge without provoking the military rulers to defy 
the resolution and block his efforts. 
Despite SLORC' s protestations against international interference in in­
ternal affairs, it needs international political support, foreign investment, 
purchase of its products, aid and loans. Its human rights record keeps most 
developed nations from lending money or approving loans from the World 
Bank and other international lending agencies. Given the level of its interna­
tional debt, estimated at $US7 billion, its lack of foreign exchange, and its 
need to sell off its nonrenewable resources to pay for its expanding army and 
military modernization, it cannot continue indefinitely the internal war and at 
the same time take the necessary steps to achieve real economic development. 
Only China and the ASEAN states have befriended Burma openly; their 
investments and trade have provided crucial support during the past six years. 
Even though a united and peaceful Burma would make it possible for them to 
expand their investments in Burma and realise greater profits, they do not 
show any desire to take the initiative in helping the Burmese solve their 
national unity problem. 9 
There is a number of reasons why the UN secretary general should 
become involved, as the General Assembly has requested. He has standing 
with both sides; his office has given neither public support nor formal recogni­
tion to any of the opposition groups at war with the government. At the same 
time, the minorities and Burmans who are free to speak out have expressed 
trust in him and have called for his or his staff's presence in proposed meet­
ings between themselves and SLORC. He and his staff have demonstrated 
impartiality whenever called upon to gather or convey information. Finally, 
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given the hardened positions of all the principals in the Burma drama, and the 
positions and statements of world leaders on Burma affairs, the secretary 
general may be the only person who is acceptable to all sides in offering a new 
perspective on the problem. 
Based on his experience in 1993-94, the secretary general knows a good 
deal about Burma' s recent past. He knows from published and widely distrib­
uted sources that from independence to the mid 1980s the government and the 
majority of the people faced revolt and demands for the right of secession 
from several ethnic minorities; that the position of most of the dissident 
minorities then changed as they fought for inclusion in a true federal union 
based on the principle of equality with the majority Burmans. He also knows 
that since 1988 the thousands of Burmans who took refuge amongst the 
minorities following the military' s brutal seizure of power made it possible for 
both to learn much about each other; in 1992 the organizations of the Burmans 
and the minorities agreed to form a common organization, the National 
Council of the Union of Burma, and to live in peace and unity while fighting 
to defeat SLORC; they agreed to call a truly national convention representing 
all the peoples of Burma to draw up a federal constitution based on equality, 
rights of self-determination, democracy, and human rights under a govern­
ment based on the principle of civilian supremacy.10 
Thus, with national reconciliation between Burmans and the minorities 
living in areas where they are free to speak out, the threat to national unity no 
longer is between the Burmans and the minorities, but between the ruler -
SLORC, who holds power by force - and the ruled - the people of Burma, 
who fight for the right to determine their own political future. In the Burma 
heartland, the absence of popular support for SLORC shows that there, too, 
the struggle is between the rulers and the ruled and not between ethnic groups. 
The secretary general also knows that the military leaders tell the story of 
Burma differently. They see the history of modern Burma as 'synonymous 
with the history of the Tatmadaw. [Burma' s army]' . Since the struggle for 
national independence following the end of World War II, 'it [the Tatmadaw] 
has been in the forefront of national politics' and has had the primary respon­
sibility for ensuring national unity. 11 
SLORC argues that the 1988 demonstrations were the work of the Burma 
Communist Party (BCP) whose secret plan was to foment demonstrations and 
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take advantage of popular discontent in order to seize power, destroy the state, 
break up national unity and fragment the territory of the union.12 
The military's version of events reports that the BCP sought to use Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi, the national leader who rose during the demonstrations, by 
infiltrating her circle of advisors. She, according to SLORC, 'has been influ­
enced by anti-government, opportunistic politicians and insurgent groups in 
their attempt to seize political power ... '. Her criticisms of General Ne Win' s 
dictatorial rule and misuse of the army against the people were seen as 
seditious and were believed to have incited 'the people to acts of violence and 
to cause di vision within the armed forces and di vision between the armed 
forces and the people.' It placed her under arrest on 20 August 1989, 'for her 
own good and for the good of the country .... '. 13 Until the collapse of the BCP 
in 1989, it posed a major threat to the nation and a challenge to the army. 
SLORC sees a second threat to national unity coming from the revolts and 
secessionist movements of the various minorities. Since 1949 it has fought 
against the Karens and other minorities; on at least two occasions it sought to 
negotiate settlements in the interest of national unity and peace, but the efforts 
failed. SLORC believes that only the military' s patriotism and sacrifice saved 
the union. 
Finally, it prides itself on having saved the nation in another way - by 
taking political power in 1958 when a split in the governing party threatened 
to erupt into a new stage of civil war. Although the military returned 
power in 1960, two years later it overthrew the government and established a 
military dictatorship, which, in various forms, governs to this day. 
The secretary general also knows that shortly after it seized power in 
1988, SLORC' s spokesmen promised that it had no intention of holding 
power longer than necessary to restore unity and peace, hold new elections 
and give power to a strong government operating under a new constitution. It 
held the elections in 1990, but refused to transfer power: instead, it 
systematically destroyed the organizations of the people in the Burma 
heartland. A few of those elected in 1990 took refuge amongst the minorities 
in the hills and, with their backing, organized a rival government, the National 
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. 
Also during this period, SLORC expanded its war against the minorities 
who rejected its offers of ceasefire. It refused to recognize and negotiate with 
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the organizations of the minorities; instead, it attacked the ethnic armies and 
brutalized the noncombatant villagers in the war zones as a way of pressuring 
the armed units to accept its offer of a ceasefire to individual groups. By 1994 
thirteen groups had signed agreements; three others remained in revolt. The 
ceasefire agreements require that those who accept them have no contact with 
former allies still in revolt. 
From his sources, the secretary general knows that SLORC has succeeded 
in destroying nearly all organized opposition groups in the nation, separating 
the people from their leaders and from each other. In this environment, it has 
convened a national convention of hand-picked delegates to write a new 
constitution which will give the military permanent leadership of the nation. It 
has also created a mass political organization, the Union Solidarity Develop­
ment Association, which appears to be the vehicle by which it will replace 
political parties as a means of mobilizing the people. 
Recognizing that SLORC' s plans for national reconciliation are well 
under way, what role can and should the secretary general play in assisting 
SLORC's 'efforts of national reconciliation'? The secretary general well 
knows that SLORC is able to impose its solution and will use armed force to 
gain compliance. He should attempt to point out to SLORC that such a course 
can produce temporary results, at best, and probably will cause a new round of 
unrest, revolt and secession. A real and lasting solution can be achieved only 
when the leaders of SLORC and the Burmese people meet, talk and develop 
answers together in an environment of trust and freedom. 
If the secretary general is to have any success he should go to Burma and 
meet with the leaders of SLORC and initiate a dialogue. By personally visiting 
Burma he will elevate the meeting to the highest level-between the head of 
the UN and the head of state. This will underscore the importance and 
seriousness of his mandate and the institutions he represents while demon­
strating his respect for the men who govern and represent Burma in world 
affairs. It will be a clear signal of the urgency that he and the members of the 
UN attach to the resolution of the Burmese situation and of his serious effort 
to carry out the responsibilities it has given him. 
In his talks, the secretary general should begin by emphasizing the inter­
national aspects of Burma's internal problems: the endless flow of refugees to 
its neighbour's lands, which is both costly and potentially destabilizing; the 
threat of border wars and international incidents resulting from intrusions into 
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neighbouring territory and causing human and property damage as well as ill 
will among neighbours; the growing opium problem which stems from the 
flow of the narcotic into and through neighbouring states, affecting the lives of 
peoples both in Burma and beyond. He should review the basis for interna­
tional concern over events inside Burma and ask why the member states in the 
General Assembly have not accepted SLORC' s responses to serious charges 
of human rights violations. He especially should convey the UN' s continuing 
concern about the [house arrest and] near isolation of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
and the continuing imprisonment of other political leaders of the victorious 
political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). He should empha­
size that these are but two of the specific violations of basic human rights 
which symbolize the large number of cases of human rights violations against 
ordinary people in the Burma heartland and the border areas. 
The secretary general should seek to enlarge the discussion by asking the 
SLORC leaders to inform him as fully as possible about the problems of 
internal war, the national convention, and the other issues which stand in the 
way of resolving national reconciliation. At the same time, he must convey to 
SLORC that the international community believes that real and lasting solu­
tions to Burma's problems can only be achieved when it and the leaders of the 
Burmese people meet and talk; they will not result from the present national 
convention. which has no popular mandate. 
The secretary general should emphasize that he has not come to offer a 
readymade plan for solving national reconciliation. His purpose is to urge that 
a permanent solution not be imposed on the people; that it should result from 
free and open discussions between SLORC, the leaders and elected represen­
tatives of the victorious parties, and the leaders of the minorities who were not 
permitted to contest the elections. 
The secretary general should make clear that his purpose is to suggest that 
SLORC needs to change the political environment and create a climate for 
discussion which is open, free and reflective of the equality of all who 
participate, and build confidence; that it wants the input and participation of 
the people and their leaders. He should emphasize that the absence of popular 
support either for the government or for the way it is going about writing a 
new constitution casts serious doubt amongst the leaders of the nations of the 
world that it will achieve national reconciliation. In the nearly five years since 
the national elections, the UN General Assembly and UNCHR find little or no 
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evidence that SLORC' s policies for national reconciliation are working; they 
believe that it is time to take a new approach. 
The new approach, the secretary general should suggest, begins with 
creating a new relationship between all parties. With all power in the hands of 
SLORC it is in a position to change the environment by taking several 
unilateral steps: 
1. Release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi unconditionally. By having met with 
her at least twice in 1994 and reporting it to the nation, SLORC demonstrated 
to the world that it recognized her unique importance and position of leader­
ship of the people. From its discussions with her, together with her written 
words, SLORC should be clear that she does not intend to foment revolution; 
instead, she stands ready to work for peaceful political change. The secretary 
general must convince SLORC that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is its only means 
of reaching the people, and can be trusted to participate in a peaceful process 
leading to national unity and a real transfer of power. She must be allowed to 
renew her contacts and exchange ideas with the people if she is to be an 
effective and responsible partner in any future dialogue. SLORC could make 
no clearer move to indicate to the Burmese and the watching world that a 
change in the political climate of Burma has begun. 
2. SLORC also must take a companion step and release all remaining 
political prisoners unconditionally so that the civilian leadership of the people 
can be reestablished. It is clear from the transcripts of the Bill Richardson and 
Aung San Suu Kyi talks and from her writings that she does not see herself as 
the lone spokesperson for the people; she has said repeatedly that she and the 
other leaders will work together and arrive at common stands which they will 
convey to the listening public. The students, monks and the NCGUB, both 
inside Burma and in exile, also must be free to return home and be reunited 
with their families and communities. This, too, will be a confidence-building 
step the people will welcome and to which they will respond positively. 
The secretary general must attempt to impress upon the military rulers 
that all restrictions on the movement of leaders and people, and their rights to 
free speech, assembly and publication must be ended so that the people will 
have further reasons to believe that real change is in progress. 
3. Probably the most important step SLORC should be encouraged to take 
is to declare a national armistice in the civil war and grant freedom of 
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movement between the leaders of the ethnic military forces and their people. It 
should call upon the opposition to join in separating armies on both sides so 
that warfare cannot be resumed accidentally. The secretary general also must 
encourage the SLORC to relax or repeal its restrictions upon minority 
groups14 which have signed ceasefire agreements and allow them to have 
contact with former allies who never signed. He should point out that such 
freedom is necessary to demonstrate that a new environment exists, that the 
minorities will have the political freedom to talk to one another and begin 
integrating themselves with the peoples in the heartland and ending their long 
isolation and division from the rest of the nation. 
Once a new environment has begun to emerge and the people have reason 
to believe that it reflects a genuine and permanent change away from 
SLORC' s dictatorial rule, the secretary general should suggest a way to use 
the new environment to take a further step to real and lasting national recon­
ciliation. He should offer to organize a unique forum for all parties, which fits 
the particular situation in Burma, where they can carry forth the process 
already begun under the earlier steps. 
A model he might consider is the one created by the Indonesian foreign 
minister for bringing together the rival forces in Cambodia and starting a 
dialogue among them. There, too, all sides in the civil war initially were 
unwilling to move toward discussions. But, by hosting an informal meeting 
and inviting all to come, with no agenda and no demand for anyone to talk to 
anyone else, there began a process which eventually led to peace. 
In the case of Burma, the secretary general might offer the UN headquar­
ters as the venue, or suggest a location either in China or Thailand with the 
three acting as co-hosts. If SLORC accepted the offer, it most likely would 
prefer a site on the territory of one of its neighbours because this would be 
seen as a friendlier location; both China and Thailand have major economic 
interests in Burma which are located in the minority areas; both know the 
SLORC and minority leaders well; both have demonstrated, by their political 
support for and business relations with SLORC, that they are Burma's friends 
and not intent upon dictating how its internal affairs should be resolved. 
Given that almost all of its internal enemies are under control and that 
foreign investment and trade are growing, SLORC may believe that it can 
continue to reject such advice and that eventually the world will come around 
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and accept its regime. But such optimism does not take into account that the 
UNCHR 1995 meeting in Geneva will endorse a stronger resolution against 
SLORC than those in the past because SLORC made no real improvement on 
the issue of human rights violations nor did it cooperate fully with the special 
rapporteur. The continued imprisonment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is decried 
by all nations of the world and many, such as Japan, once Burma's major 
source of financial support, have said bluntly that there will be no real aid for 
Burma until she is released. Although ASEAN' s members remain quiet and 
supportive of SLORC, they have seen no real political change in Burma 
despite their 'constructive engagement' policy. And several ASEAN states 
have made further progress in their relations conditional on her release. 
SLORC knows that refusal to cooperate with the secretary general in 
carrying out his mandated mission will only harden the nations of the world 
against it and could cause them to increase their pressure at the General 
Assembly in 1995. SLORC could face a call for a world embargo against its 
products, a call for foreign companies to halt doing business in Burma, and a 
tourist embargo in 1996, the year SLORC has designated as 'Visit Myanmar 
[Burma] Year'. 
Finally, SLORC knows that its ceasefire agreement with the minorities15 
are not peace treaties ending the threat of renewed warfare. While SLORC 
scored a major victory over the Karens in January 1995, it did not defeat them 
or force them to accept a ceasefire on its terms. Also, the renewal of large­
scale w�are against the Karens, after having announced a unilateral ceasefire 
in April 1992, was a blow to SLORC' s credibility and the reliability of its 
word. The weakening of the Karens will hurt the efforts of the Mons and 
Karenni who continue their fight, but there are no signs that any of the three 
will end their wars. 
Both the SLORC and the world know that the minorities in revolt still are 
in a position to impede the construction of the gas pipeline in their area and to 
threaten it once it is built. Both also know that the instability in the country­
side continues to present greater risks to investment than many foreign firms 
may be willing to take. And while SLORC proudly announces the growing 
size of international investment, most money has been promised but not 
actually invested; with citizen boycotts and demonstrations in the US and 
elsewhere gaining success against products made in Burma, the likelihood of 
new long-term investment by private enterprise remains slim. 
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The General Assembly' s  request to the secretary general to assist in the 
implementation of the resolution and help SLORC achieve national reconcili­
ation offers SLORC a way out of its difficulties. It remains to be seen if 
SLORC is wise enough to seize the opportunity to solve problems which, thus 
far, have eluded it. 
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FEDERALISM AS A SOLUTION TO THE 
* 
ETHNIC PROBLEM IN BURMA 
From 4 January 1948, the day the Union of Burma came into existence as an 
independent nation, the Burmese people and their leaders have been divided 
over how to achieve national unity and structure their state. Until 1988, Burma 
was federal in name and theory, but unitary in practice. After nearly five 
decades of political discussion, peaceful movements for secession or 
autonomy, and warfare, the majority Burmans and most of the ethnic 
minorities remain disunited. From time to time efforts have been made by the 
government of Burma and the minorities, either alone or in groups, to end 
revolt and disunity, but none has succeeded. 
Today, the basic problem is the same as that which the nation's founding 
fathers faced nearly fifty years ago: how to construct a political system 
wherein diverse peoples feel free and equal, able to govern themselves in their 
own areas, and to protect and preserve their languages, cultures and traditions, 
while at the same time give their political loyalty to the nation-state. 
But today's political conditions are different from those when the state 
was created. In 194 7, the Burman leaders made a sincere effort to win the 
participation of the minorities in a common political union. Both at the 
Panglong Conference and, later, at the constitutional convention, the partici­
pants came as equals, seeking each other's help and agreement; the partici­
pants thought they found the answer in the idea of a federal union. But the 
state they erected was soon challenged by misunderstandings and mistrust as 
faulty draftsmanship, fundamental disagreements about how power was di­
vided, the degree of local authority, and the threat of Burmanization led to 
* This paper was prepared for an International Conference of Experts, on 'Federalism Against 
Ethnicity? Institutional, Legal, and Democratic Instruments to Prevent or Resolve Violent 
Minority Conflicts', sponsored by the Swiss Peace Foundation in Basel, Switzerland, in 
September 1995. The editors are grateful to the Swiss Peace Foundation for allowing the 
publication of the paper in this series. 
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disunity, discontent and rebellion. In 1962, the military overthrew the govern­
ment arguing that such a move was necessary because the minorities were 
bent on breaking up the union and creating independent states. The coup 
leaders set aside the constitution and, under their decrees, created a centralized 
state with all power located in Rangoon. Twelve years later, in 197 4, they 
institutionalized the unitary state in a new constitution while retaining a 
nominal federal form; under the principle of democratic centralism, they 
concentrated authority at the apex, made all subunits of government subordi­
nate, and placed the whole system under a single political party created and 
controlled by the military. 
The new constitution did not bring peace and national unity; instead, it 
brought wider revolution and new demands by some minorities for the right to 
leave the union. 
In September 1988 Burma's military leaders seized power from the gov­
ernment they had created fourteen years earlier, abrogated the constitution 
they had written, and set the nation on a new course. Following their 
dissatisfaction with the outcome of a free and fair election in 1990, which 
would have handed power to the representatives of the people, the soldier­
rulers wrote a charter (Declaration 1/90) empowering themselves to govern by 
martial law and began erecting a new state structure. Through force and 
negotiations, they created the illusion of peace by crushing all opposition in 
the Burman heartland and by signing ceasefire agreements with fifteen ethnic 
groups, leaving, at the time of writing (August 1995), only two in open revolt. 
Today, the military rulers, the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) are in the process of imposing their ideas about how to solve 
Burma's long-festering national unity problem. While the soldier-rulers have 
given the appearance of consulting some of the minorities and have brought 
them into the formal process, the majority of ethnic groups - those who have 
been at war with the state and have entered into ceasefire agreements - have 
not been included. They have been working, since the beginning of the 
decade, to develop their ideas about a state structure based on the principles of 
equality, federalism, democracy and human rights. They look to the future 
when a constitution-making process, like that of 1947, will emerge and they 
will be able to engage in full and open discussion with the leaders of the 
military and the Burman peoples; together, they hope a new constitution will 
16 
be written which all will support, making it possible for the peoples of Burma 
to live peacefully together and solve problems by parliamentary means. 
Since 1990 SLORC has slowly revealed its ideas about the constitution 
and the political structure of Burma it wants to put in place. From its several 
statements about why it seized power and what it wants to see established 
before it transfers power, there is a number of implied as well as expressed 
assumptions. 
1. There must be an end to social and political disunity and the threat to 
the integrity of the state. SLORC never tires of reminding the people that its 
primary purpose in taking and holding power in 1988 stemmed from the 
'Three Causes': prevention of the disintegration of the Union; prevention of 
the disintegration of national unity; and perpetuation of sovereignty. Its lead­
ers speak frequently of the threats to Burma posed by the rebellions of the 
Burma Communist Party (BCP), the ethnic minorities, the invasion of foreign 
forces, the breakdown in law and order in 1988, and the interference in 
internal affairs by foreign governments. With the demise of the BCP, the end 
of the threat of foreign invasion, the reestablishment of law and order in the 
heartland and the ceasefires with most of the minorities, the military now is 
putting all its energies into writing a constitution which will eliminate forever 
the three causes and establish permanent peace and unity in the nation. 
2. There must be recognition of the rights and interests of the several 
minorities and they must approve of the constitution before it can be imple­
mented. Under the two previous constitutions the rights and interests of 
several minorities, especially the smaller ones, were not clearly stated and this 
led to misunderstanding, discontent and revolt. The military wants all minor­
ity groups recognized, and wants their participation in the drafting of the 
constitution and approval of the final draft. In the past, the larger ethnic 
minorities spoke for the smaller ones living amongst them; for many, this was 
unsatisfactory. To avoid a repetition of the past, the military is determined to 
win minority support by granting ethnic minorities nominal control of local 
administration in their areas and allowing them to preserve their cultures and 
traditions. 
3. The future constitution must be based on a multiparty political system. 
After fulfilling a promise to hold multiparty elections, the military talks about 
the creation of a 'multiparty democratic system' as a goal for the new constitu-
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tion. It makes no mention of a federal union. It is clear that SLORC, rather 
than establish democracy on the Western model used in the past, intends to 
create a directed state in which elected representatives will be able to ratify the 
policies, legislation and actions of the leaders. It looks to the military-led 
polity of Indonesia as one model. 
4. The military must be given a permanent role in governing the future 
state of Burma. In the past, when national and territorial unity and sovereignty 
were threatened, the military, as a last resort, was called upon to save the 
situation. SLORC argues that it paid a heavy price in personnel losses as it 
fought to save the nation in the face of opposition forces which had been 
allowed to grow strong and entrenched. This cycle can be be broken, it 
believes, only if the military has a leading role in the government during 
normal times and can shape national policies which will settle disputes before 
any threat matures. 
Acting under the authority it has given itself in Declaration 1/90, the 
military created a National Convention to draw up the principles for the new 
constitution. It began its work in January 1993 following the selection and 
invitation of 702 delegates, representing political parties, the ethnic minori­
ties, social classes and distinguished individuals, to carry out the task under its 
guidance. With the exception of delegates who were elected in 1990 to the 
national parliament, the delegates neither have a popular mandate nor head 
groups for whom they are authorized to speak. Amongst the minorities in­
vited, there are none from those who entered into ceasefires after the Conven­
tion began. The members of the National Convention are restricted in dis­
cussing with people outside what happens at meetings ; they also are restricted 
in discussing with other delegates the issues under consideration in meetings, 
except in accordance with the narrow rules imposed by the convenors. Some 
of the delegates, dissatisfied with the process, left and have either sought 
refuge among the minorities still outside SLORC' s control or gone abroad; 
others have been arrested and imprisoned. After more than two years, the 
National Convention still has not completed its mission. 
On two important issues, the National Convention has finished its work: 
the state structure, and the role of the military in the political leadership of the 
nation. The National Convention has agreed that there will be a nominal 
federal union consisting of a national government and fourteen states and 
regions. Within the states and regions there will be self-administered areas for 
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the ethnic groups. The larger of these areas will be designated as self-adminis­
tered divisions and the smaller as self-administered zones. Although it re­
mains for the constitutional convention to define the powers and limits of 
these divisions and zones, it is agreed that the various ethnic groups should be 
able to practise and preserve their traditions and cultures, while the state will 
have responsibility for helping develop local languages and literature, fine arts 
and cultures of the national races; the state also will help promote social and 
economic development. One representative from each of the self-adminis­
tered divisions and zones will be sent to the National Parliament. 
Thus far, the National Convention has adopted no principles to guide the 
authors of the future constitution on how the states, regions, and self-adminis­
tered divisions and areas will finance their governments and programs. Since 
land and economic resources have been designated as belonging to the state, 
the power to tax residents and businesses, if granted, will provide limited 
income, especially in the smaller and poorer subdivisions. Thus, as under the 
previous two constitutions, the subunits of government will be dependent 
upon the national government for most funding and this will open the door to 
interference in local affairs. 
The principles adopted regarding a leading role for the military reflect a 
great concern for the security of the state from enemies both within and 
without. The future president of the nation must have extensive military 
experience and have resided in Burma continuously for twenty years; the two 
houses of the legislature must reserve 25 per cent of seats for the military 
representatives chosen by the Minister of Defence. The budget and adminis­
tration of the military will be under the control of the Minister of Defence and 
beyond the scrutiny of the civilian-dominated legislature. In times of national 
emergency, the head of the armed forces can take all state power and exercise 
it for as long as necessary. 
In this blueprint for a garrison state the National Convention is planning to 
erect, the military will have a permanent role in the subunits of the state 
through participation in administration at all levels and responsibility for 
defence, security and border administration; in times of national emergency it 
will have the same powers in the subunits as it has at the national level. 
If it is the military' s objective to create a multiparty democratic system, it 
is hard to see what powers and responsibilities remain for the people to 
exercise. 
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If the adopted principles for the new constitution are compared with the 
structure of the government and the powers of the Burma Socialist Program 
Party under the 1974 constitution, it is clear that SLORC intends to recreate 
the earlier model; only this time, it has replaced the party with the military and 
has given the military all powers necessary to overcome popular opposition 
wherever and whenever it occurs. 
There is an alternative set of principles for the organization of the state 
and society developed by the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), an 
enlarged coalition of the National Democratic Front- an organization of the 
minorities - students, monks and other individuals. Drawn up by a small 
committee of the DAB, the authors began their work by studying various 
federal systems. 'They mixed borrowed ideas with their own to produce a 
constitutional solution for Burma's longstanding problem of national unity. 
The committee produced three drafts under its original Kachin chairman and a 
final draft after the Kachins withdrew from the NDF and DAB. 'The third 
draft was reviewed and discussed at a seminar of international experts and the 
final draft, reflecting the criticisms and comments made at the meeting, was 
adopted by the lst Congress of the DAB in July 1993. 
The object of the study/drafting committee was to find a way to end a state 
of warfare and disunity in Burma and to create a federal system where all 
parties could preserve and protect their cultures and traditions. Anticipating 
the day when representatives, freely chosen by the people, would be able to sit 
together, exchange ideas and arrive at common acceptable solutions, the 
committee hoped to prepare its future representatives so that they could 
articulate the interests of their groups and contribute to erecting a lasting 
political structure all could accept and defend. 
At the heart of the DAB proposals is the idea that the source of power 
resides in the people. The people must be free and equal, and enjoy the right of 
self-determination. They must have rights and freedoms as set forth in the 
constitution and the political process must be democratic. The society must be 
organized as a federal union in which the constituent units are based on the 
principles of equality and self-determination. The territory of Burma will be 
divided into National States and Nationalities States. Under conditions set 
forth in the proposed constitution, the states will be subdivided further into 
National Autonomous Regions and Special National Territories. National 
States will be based on the existence of a large national group, representing 
20 
two thirds of the population and recognized as an historical group, with a 
common territory, language, customs, culture and viable economy. 
Nationalities States will be composed of two or more ethnic groups, none of 
which has two thirds of the population, a common territory and a viable 
economy. 
National Autonomous Regions will be formed inside states among 
nationalities making up one quarter of the state population and living on 
historic lands, each having a separate language, literature and culture. Special 
National Territories will be formed in areas where a nationality has a majority 
in the territory, and a separate language, culture and customs. 
Recognizing that the military in the past abrogated the constitution, 
changed political configurations and usurped the power of the people, the 
DAB proposals set forth the idea of civilian supremacy with the military 
subordinate to the elected government and not an independent actor. It will 
never interfere in political matters and it will have no place in the national 
legislature or administration and no role in the subunits of government. The 
armed forces are to be commanded by the Minister of Defence and no active 
member of the defence forces will be appointed as minister. Defence policy 
will be set by the Defence minister and the federal cabinet. The armed forces 
will be formed from troops drawn proportionately from the member states. 
Each state will send a proportionate number of candidates to the military 
academies for training as officers. The president will appoint, upon the 
recommendation of the prime minister, the commander-in-chief; the office 
shall be rotated among the military commanders from each state who together 
will form a board of commanders. The constitutional draft of the DAB would 
restrict members of the armed forces, at any time, from interfering in political 
matters, involving themselves in business and from declaring a state of 
emergency, a military administration or martial law. 
A careful reading of the DAB constitutional proposals makes clear how 
differently its authors view the problems and solutions of Burma' s disunity 
and civil war. By the solutions the minorities offer, in the way of a new basic 
law, the problems are seen as stemming from an absence of human rights and 
the existence of a true federal union. The most important denial has been the 
right of the people to rule themselves; this was taken from them by the 
military coup of 1 962 and was not returned under the 197 4 constitution; and it 
is not granted in the National Convention proposals. In the past the national 
21 
army misused its arms against the people and usurped what little power they 
had. Because the minority-written constitution starts from assumptions the 
other will not acknowledge and offers solutions the other has not even 
considered, there seems to be no way to resolve the problem of disunity and 
there is a strong probability that there will be a renewal of warfare in the 
future. 
With the two sides so far apart and with the military determined to impose 
its solution, an outside voice to offer a third way may be the answer. 
At the 1994 UN General Assembly meeting, the Assembly adopted a 
Burma resolution which included a request to the secretary general to help the 
government of Burma achieve national reconciliation. During 1995, his depu­
ties made efforts to speak to the members of SLORC and to the minorities -
both those in revolt and in ceasefire agreements with the armed forces. While 
reports of his efforts are not available, the fact that the world body asked the 
secretary general to offer assistance in solving the problem of national unity 
reflected the belief in the General Assembly that a third party was necessary to 
move the issue forward in a positive way. It remains to be seen if SLORC will 
depart from its previous position, that the issue is an internal matter and not 
the concern of the world body, and allow the secretary general to contribute to 
a lasting solution. 
If SLORC acknowledges the request in the General Assembly resolution, 
the secretary general will find the DAB constitutional proposals a good 
starting point. With their emphasis upon human rights, popular rule, and 
federalism, they offer the outlines for the only solution likely to succeed. It 
should be clear to the secretary general that SLORC' s proposals for a unitary 
state cloaked in federal dress was intended to disguise the real outcome of the 
National Convention principles and will not provide a lasting solution. The 
secretary general should know from the talks his deputies had with the 
minorities that the people do not want a 'Potemkin Village';  they want a real 
federal union. The secretary general also should know that if SLORC is to 
surrender its power to popular rule peacefully, the military must be offered 
some kind of role in government. Here the creativity and wisdom of the 
secretary general will prove invaluable. There is a useful model for this 
problem in Chile. 
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Finally, the secretary general knows that, after five decades of struggle, 
the minorities have been willing to sacrifice life and property to achieve what 
they were promised in 194 7 and there is little likelihood that they will accept 
anything less now or in the foreseeable future. A careful reading of Burma' s 
history will show that long before the British arrived the minorities lived 
under their own leaders, spoke their own languages, and developed and passed 
on their culture and traditions. Only in 1947 did the minorities voluntarily 
accept the Burman invitation to join in forming an independent union. It was 
the promise of that union the minorities sought to achieve and still desire. 
They stand ready today to form a union with the Burmans provided that it is 
based on the principles they fought for and enunciated in the several DAB 
constitutional proposals. They are ready to discuss their proposals alongside 
those offered from other quarters. They will accept refinement and further 
elaboration when they are discussed in a future constitutional assembly and 
will leave it to the elected representatives of the people to decide. 
Today, SLORC has the power to solve the problem and end the threat of 
war and disunity forever. With the help of the secretary general, SLORC may 
be convinced that a peaceful federal union under democratic civilian rule is 
better than a permanently hostile population and the threat of renewed internal 
war. 
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